Mar 08 2012

The End of the Credit Default Swap

Credit Default Swaps (CDS) Are Insurance Products, Not Tradeable Assets

Author: Barry Ritholtz, EconoMonitor

March 2nd, 2012

The CFMA radically deregulated derivatives. The law changed the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) to exempt derivatives transactions from regulations as either “futures” (under the CEA) or “securities” under federal securities laws. Further, the CFMA specifically exempted Credit Defaults Swaps and other derivative products from regulation by any State Insurance Board or Regulators.

This rule change exempting CDS from insurance oversight led to a very specific economic behavioral change: Companies that wrote insurance had to explicitly reserve for expected losses and eventual payout in a conservative manner. Companies that wrote Credit Defaults Swaps did not.

Hence, AIG was able to underwrite over THREE TRILLION DOLLARS worth of derivatives, reserving precisely zero dollars agianst potential claims. This was enormously lucrative, except for that whole crashing & burning into insolvency thingie.

How Greece’s default could kill the sovereign CDS market

By Felix Salmon, Reuters

February 29, 2012

The way that CDS auctions are meant to work is that once a borrower defaults on its debt, that defaulted debt continues to be traded in the market, and its value then determines the amount that credit default swaps need to pay out. But in this case, Greece’s defaulted debt might well not continue to be traded in the market. In which case, when traders need to find a cheapest-to-deliver bond to bid on in the CDS auction, they’re going to have to use one of the new bonds, rather than one of the old ones.

In other words, Greece’s CDS really aren’t protecting holders of Greek bonds at all – or if they do, it’s more a matter of luck than of law. When they get paid out on their CDS holdings, people owning protection against a Greek default won’t get paid according to how much money they lost on their old bonds. Instead, they’ll get paid according to the nominal price of the new bonds.

What this means is that the CDS architecture is broken, and can’t cope with collective action clauses. And as a result, according to the hedge fund manager who tipped me off to the whole problem, “this Greece CDS imbroglio might be the final blow for sovereign CDS as a product.”

Greece Readies Record Debt Swap With 60% Commitments

By Maria Petrakis and Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, Bloomberg News

Mar 8, 2012 6:59 AM ET

While Greece would prefer a voluntary deal, the government has said it will use collective action clauses to force holders of Greek-law bonds into the swap if the so-called private sector involvement falls short and it gets sufficient approval from investors to change the bonds’ terms.

“I think that the markets are aware of the risk that a majority for voluntary restructuring is not available, and so I think the surprise won’t be too big if tonight when they realize the collective action clauses will have to be applied,” Bofinger said.

“I do fully expect to be part of the collective action clause,” Patrick Armstrong, managing partner at Armstrong Investment Managers in London, said yesterday in a Bloomberg Television interview. He won’t voluntarily join in the swap because of the “minuscule” chance his bond maturing March 20 will be redeemed at face value.

Compelling holdouts to take part will likely trigger insurance contracts on the debt known as credit default swaps.

“I can’t see any scenario where people are forced to participate against their will and they aren’t triggered,” Armstrong said.

How all CDS are at risk of not paying out

By Felix Salmon, Reuters

March 5, 2012

At heart, the problem is what happens when an issuer swaps out all of its bonds for some new bonds. There’s no reason at all why the new bonds should trade at a massive discount to par – indeed, issuers often like it when their new bonds trade at or near 100 cents on the dollar. But if the CDS auction happens after the bond exchange, and if all of the old bonds are exchanged, then holders of the new bonds are forced to tender new bonds into the exchange, even if they’re trading at 100 cents on the dollar. Which means that holders of old bonds could suffer a huge haircut in the value of their bonds, but still get no payout from their CDS.

This has been an issue in the past. When Anglo Irish Bank restructured its bonds, it amended the old bonds to include a call option which allowed the bank to buy back every €1,000 of bonds for €0.01. That was an effective way of wiping out the value of the old bonds – but it also risked serious damage to the CDS market, since in a CDS auction, the value of a bond is calculated as the price of the bond considered as a percentage of the outstanding principal – and the outstanding principal is considered to be not the face value of the bond but rather the amount of the call option. If Anglo Irish had done the exchange quickly, before a CDS auction was possible, then bondholders would have had to tender bonds with a call option at €0.01 – which would mean that they couldn’t claim any payout on their CDS at all.

In the end, Anglo Irish took pity on the CDS holders, and staggered its restructuring so that there was enough time for ISDA to conduct an auction before the bonds got changed out of all recognition. But hoping that the issuer will act in a friendly manner is not exactly an optimum strategy – especially since, by definition, the issuer will be in the process of going bust.

This doesn’t just seem unsatisfactory at first blush; it is unsatisfactory. And there is no second blush. Essentially, CDS holders are reduced to hoping that the issuer will be nice, and structure the exchange in such a way as to let them get paid out. But there’s no particular reason why the issuer should do that, especially seeing as how the CDS holders were the people who were effectively shorting the issuer as it tumbled into bankruptcy.

If you own protection on a credit, then, you’re very much in a world of caveat emptor. You can trade in and out of CDS and make a good living; these things are, first and foremost, trading vehicles. That’s why they’re more liquid than bonds. But if you have a strategy which involves actually getting paid out on your CDS in the event of default, then you should definitely worry that the payout might not happen, even if the event of default is clear and declared. What’s more, there’s really no good way to hedge that risk.

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